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Monetary Policy and the 
Open Economy 
All the models analyzed in earlier chapters assumed a closed economy: households 
and ﬁrms were not able to trade in goods or ﬁnancial assets with agents located 
in other economies. This chapter relaxes that assumption by developing an open 
economy extension of the basic New Keynesian model analyzed in chapter 3. The 
framework introduces explicitly the exchange rate, the terms of trade, exports, 
and imports, as well as international ﬁnancial markets. It also implies a distinction 
between the consumer price index—that includes the price of imported goods— 
and the price index for domestically produced goods. Such a framework can in 
principle be used to assess the implications of alternative monetary policy rules 
for an open economy. Because the framework nests as a limiting case the closed 
economy model of chapter 3, it allows the exploration of the extent to which the 
opening of the economy affects some of the conclusions regarding monetary policy 
obtained for the closed economy model: in particular, the desirability of a policy 
that seeks to stabilize inﬂation (see chapter 4). It is also worth analyzing what role, 
if any, the exchange rate plays in the optimal design of monetary policy and/or 
what is the measure of inﬂation that the central bank should seek to stabilize. 
Finally, the framework can be used to determine the implications of alternative 
simple rules, as was done in chapter 4 for the closed economy. 
The analysis of a monetary open economy raises a number of issues that a mod­
eler needs to confront, and which are absent from its closed economy counterpart. 
First, a choice needs to be made between the modelling of a “large” or “small” 
economy, i.e., between allowing or not, respectively, for repercussions in the rest 
of the world of developments (including policy decisions) in the economy being 
modelled. Second, the existence of two or more economies subject to imperfectly 
correlated shocks generates an incentive to trade in assets between residents of 
different countries in order to smooth their consumption over time.  Hence,  a 
decision must be made regarding the nature of international asset markets and, 
more speciﬁcally, the set of securities that can be traded in those markets, with 
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possible assumptions ranging from ﬁnancial autarky to complete markets. Third, 
one needs to make some assumption about ﬁrms’ abilities to discriminate across 
countries in the price they charge for the goods they produce (“pricing to market” 
versus “law of one price”). Furthermore, whenever discrimination is possible and 
prices are not readjusted continuously, an assumption must be made regarding the 
currency in which the prices of exported goods are set (“local currency pricing,” 
i.e., prices are set in the currency of the importing economy versus “producer 
currency pricing,” i.e., prices are set in the currency of the producer’s country). 
Other dimensions of open economy modelling that require some choices include 
the allowance or not of nontradeable goods, the existence of trading costs, the 
possibility of international policy coordination, and so on. 
A comprehensive analysis of those different modelling dimensions and how 
they may affect the design of monetary policy would require a book of its own, 
thus it is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. The modest objective here is to 
present an example of a monetary open economy model to illustrate some of the 
issues that emerge in the analysis of such economies and which are absent from 
their closed economy counterparts. In particular, a small open economy model is 
developed, with complete international ﬁnancial markets, where the law of one 
price holds. Then, in the discussion of the model’s policy implications and in the 
notes on the literature in section 7.6, there is reference made to a number of papers 
that adopt different assumptions and brieﬂy discuss the extent to which this leads 
their ﬁndings to differ from those obtained here. 
The framework below,  originally developed in Galí and Monacelli (2005), 
models a small open economy as one among a continuum of (inﬁnitesimally 
small) economies making up the world economy. For simplicity, and in order 
to focus on the issues brought about by the openness of the economy, the pos­
sible presence of either cost-push shocks or nominal wage rigidities is ignored. 
The assumptions on preferences and technology, combined with the Calvo price-
setting structure and the assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets, give rise to 
a highly tractable model and to simple and intuitive log-linearized equilibrium 
conditions. The latter can be reduced to a two-equation dynamical system con­
sisting of a New Keynesian Phillips curve and a dynamic IS-type equation, whose 
structure is identical to the one derived in chapter 3 for the closed economy, 
though its coefﬁcients depend on parameters that are speciﬁc to the open econ­
omy while the driving forces are a function of world variables (that are taken as 
exogenous to the small open economy). As in its closed economy counterpart, the 
two equations must be complemented with a description of how monetary policy 
is conducted. 
After describing the model and deriving a simple representation of its equilib­
rium dynamics, section 7.3 analyzes the transmission of monetary policy shocks, 
emphasizing the role played by openness in that transmission. Section 7.4 turns 
to the issue of optimal monetary policy design, focusing on a particular case for 7.1.  A Small Open Economy Model  151 
which the ﬂexible price allocation is efﬁcient. Under the same assumptions it is 
straightforward to derive a second-order approximation to the consumer’s utility, 
which can be used to evaluate alternative policy rules. Section 7.5 assesses the 
merits of two different Taylor-type rules, a policy that fully stabilizes the CPI, 
and an exchange rate peg. Section 7.6 concludes with a brief note on the related 
literature. 
7.1  A Small Open Economy Model 
The world economy is modelled as a continuum of small open economies repre­
sented by the unit interval. Since each economy is of measure zero, its performance 
does not have any impact on the rest of the world. Different economies are subject 
to imperfectly correlated productivity shocks, but it is assumed that they share 
identical preferences, technology, and market structure. 
Next, the problem facing households and ﬁrms located in one such economy 
will be described in detail. Before doing so, a brief remark on notation is in order. 
Because the focus is on the behavior of a single economy and its interaction with 
the world economy, and in order to lighten the notation,variables are used without 
an i-index to refer to the small open economy being modelled. Variables with an 
i ∈[ 0,1] subscript refer to economy i, one among the continuum of economies 
making up the world economy. Finally, variables with an asterisk superscript (*) 
correspond to the world economy as a whole. 
7.1.1  Households 
A typical small open economy is inhabited by a representative household who 





t U(Ct,N t)  (1) 
t=0 
where Nt  denotes hours of labor,  and Ct  is a composite consumption index 
deﬁned by 
η 
1  η−1 1  η−1  η−1 
η  η η η Ct ≡
 
(1 −α)  (CH,t)  +α  (CF,t) 
  
(2) 
where CH,t is an index of consumption of domestic goods given by the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function 
   1     ε 
ε−1  ε−1 
CH,t ≡ CH,t(j)  ε  dj
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where j ∈[ 0, 1] denotes the good variety.1  CF,t is an index of imported goods 
given by 
γ     1   
γ −1  γ −1 
γ CF,t ≡ (Ci,t)  di
0 
where Ci,t is, in turn, an index of the quantity of goods imported from country i 
and consumed by domestic households. It is given by an analogous CES function 
   1     ε 
ε−1  ε−1 
Ci,t ≡ Ci,t(j)  ε  dj . 
0 
Note that parameter ε>  1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between vari­
eties produced within any given country.2 Parameter α ∈[ 0, 1] can be interpreted 
as a measure of openness.3 Parameter η>  0 measures the substitutability between 
domestic and foreign goods from the viewpoint of the domestic consumer, while 
γ  measures  the  substitutability  between  goods  produced  in  different  foreign 
countries. 
Maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form 
  1 
PH,t  (j) CH,t  (j) dj 
0 
+
  1   1 
Pi,t(j) Ci,t(j) dj di +Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1}≤Dt +WtNt +Tt  (3) 
0 0 
for t = 0, 1, 2,...  where PH,t  (j ) is the price of domestic variety j. Pi,t(j) is 
the price of variety j imported from country i. Dt+1 is the nominal payoff in 
period t +1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t (and which includes 
shares in ﬁrms), Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt denotes lump-sum transfers/taxes. 
The previous variables are all expressed in units of domestic currency. Qt,t+1 is 
the stochastic discount factor for one-period-ahead nominal payoffs relevant to 
the domestic household. Assume that households have access to a complete set of 
contingent claims, traded internationally. 
1 As discussed below, each country produces a continuum of differentiated goods, represented by the 
unit interval. 
2 Notice that it is irrelevant to think of integrals like the one in (2) as including or not the corresponding 
variable for the small economy being modelled, because its presence would have a negligible inﬂuence 
on the integral itself (in fact, each individual economy has a zero measure). The previous remark also 
applies to many other expressions involving integrals over the continuum of economies (i.e., over i) that 
the reader will encounter below. 
3 Equivalently, 1 −α is a measure of the degree of home bias. Note that in the absence of some home 
bias the households in the small open economy would attach an inﬁnitesimally small weight to local 
goods, and consumption expenditures would be allocated to imported goods (except for an inﬁnitesimally 
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The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category of goods 
yields the demand functions 
CH,t  (j ) =
 
PH,t  (j ) 
 −ε 





PH,t  Pi,t 
1−ε for  all  i, j ∈[ 0, 1],  where  PH,t ≡
   
0
1 PH,t  (j )1−ε dj
   1 
is  the  domestic 
price  index  (i.e.,  an  index  of  prices  of  domestically  produced  goods)  and 
Pi,t ≡




ε  is a price index for goods imported from country i 0 
(expressed in domestic currency) for all i ∈[ 0, 1]. Combining the optimality con­




1 PH,t  (j ) CH,t  (j ) dj = PH,t CH,t and 
 
0
1 Pi,t(j ) Ci,t(j ) dj = Pi,t Ci,t . 
Furthermore,  the optimal allocation of expenditures on imported goods by 
country of origin implies 
   −γ 
Ci,t =
Pi,t  CF,t  (5)
PF,t 
1−γ  1−γ for all i ∈[ 0, 1] where PF,t ≡
    1 Pi,t  di
   1 
is the price index for imported 0 
goods, also expressed in domestic currency. Note that (5), together with the deﬁ­
nitions of PF,t and CF,t  , implies that total expenditures on imported goods can be 
written as 
   1 Pi,t Ci,t di  = PF,t CF,t  . 0 
Finally, the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported 
goods is given by 









Pt  Pt 
1 
1−η where Pt ≡[ (1 −α) (PH,t  )1−η +α( P F,t  )1−η]  is the CPI.4 Note that under the 
assumption of η = 1 or, alternatively, when the price indexes for domestic and 
foreign goods are equal (as in the steady state described below), parameter α 
corresponds to the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods. It 
is also in this sense that α represents a natural index of openness. 
Accordingly,  total  consumption  expenditures  by  domestic  households  are 
given by PH,t  CH,t +PF,t  CF,t = PtCt . Thus, the period budget constraint can be 
rewritten as 
Pt Ct +Et {Qt,t+1 Dt+1}≤Dt +Wt Nt +Tt.  (7) 
4 It is useful to notice, for future reference, that in the particular case of η = 1, the CPI takes the form 
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1+ϕ . Thus, the remaining optimality conditions for the 






which is the standard intratemporal optimality condition. In order to derive the 
relevant intertemporal optimality condition note that the following relation must 
hold for the optimizing household in the small open economy 
Vt,t+1  Ct 







Pt  Pt+1 
where Vt,t+1 is the period t price (in domestic currency) of an Arrow security, i.e., 
a one-period security that yields one unit of domestic currency if a speciﬁc state 
of nature is realized in period t + 1, and nothing otherwise, and where ξt,t+1 is the 
probability of that state of nature being realized in t + 1 (conditional on the state 
of nature at t). Variables Ct+1  and Pt+1  on the right side should be interpreted 
as representing the values taken by the consumption index and the CPI at t + 1 
conditional on the state of nature to which the Arrow security refers to being 
realized. Thus, the left side captures the utility loss resulting from the purchase of 
theArrow security considered (with the corresponding reduction in consumption), 
whereas the right side measures the expected one-period-ahead utility gain from 
the additional consumption made possible by the (eventual) security payoff. If the 
consumer is optimizing the expected utility gain, it must exactly offset the current 
utility loss. 
Given that the price of Arrow securities and the one-period stochastic discount 
factor are related by the equation Qt,t+1 ≡ 
Vt,t+1 , (9) can be rewritten as5 
ξt,t+1 
   −σ    
Ct+1  Pt  β  = Qt,t+1  (10)
Ct  Pt+1 
which is assumed to be satisﬁed for all possible states of nature at t and t + 1. 
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (10) and rearranging terms, a 
conventional stochastic Euler equation can be derived 
    −σ      
Ct+1  Pt  Qt = βE t  (11)
Ct  Pt+1 
where Qt ≡ Et{Qt,t+1} denotes the price of a one-period discount bond paying 
off one unit of domestic currency in t + 1. 
5 Note that under complete markets a simple no room for arbitrage argument implies that the price of 
a one-period asset (or portfolio) yielding a random payoff Dt+1 must be given by 
  
Vt,t+1Dt+1 where 
the sum is over all possible t + 1 states. Equivalently, that price can be written as Et
   Vt,t+1 Dt+1
 
. Thus,  ξt,t+1 
the one-period stochastic discount factor can be deﬁned as Qt,t+1 ≡ 
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For future reference,  recall that (8) and (11) can be respectively written in 
log-linearized form as 
wt −pt = σc t +ϕn t 
1 
ct = Et{ct+1}−  (it −Et{πt+1}−ρ)  (12)
σ 
where lowercase letters denote the logs of the respective variables, it ≡−log Qt 
is  the  short  term  nominal  rate,  ρ ≡−log β  is  the  time  discount  rate,  and 
πt ≡ pt −pt−1 is CPI inﬂation (with pt ≡ log Pt). 
7.1.1.1	 Domestic Inﬂation, CPI Inﬂation, the Real Exchange Rate, 
and the Terms of Trade: Some Identities 
Next, several assumptions and deﬁnitions are introduced, and a number of identi­
ties are derived that are extensively used below. Bilateral terms of trade between 
the domestic economy and country i is deﬁned as Si,t = 
Pi,t , i.e., the price of  PH,t 





   1     1 
1−γ 
1−γ  = di i,t S
0 
which can be approximated (up to ﬁrst order) around a symmetric steady state 
satisfying Si,t = 1 for all i ∈[ 0,1] by 
  1 
st = si,t di	 (13) 
0 
where st ≡ log St = pF,t −pH,t. 
Similarly,  log-linearization of the CPI formula around the same symmetric 
steady state yields 
pt ≡ (1 −α) pH,t +αp F,t 
= pH,t +αs t.  (14) 
It is useful to note, for future reference, that (13) and (14) hold exactly when 
γ = 1 and η = 1, respectively. 
It follows that domestic inﬂation, deﬁned as the rate of change in the index 
of domestic goods prices, i.e., πH,t ≡ pH,t+1 −pH,t, and CPI inﬂation are linked 
according to the relation 
πt = πH,t +α� s t	 (15) 156  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
which makes the gap between the two measures of inﬂation proportional to the 
percent change in the terms of trade, with the coefﬁcient of proportionality given 
by the openness index α. 
Assume that the law of one price holds for individual goods at all times (both for 
import and export prices), implying that Pi,t(j ) = Ei,t P i (j) for all i,j ∈[ 0, 1], i,t 
where Ei,t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of country i’s currency 
in terms of the domestic currency), and Pi,t
i (j ) is the price of country i’s good 
j expressed in terms of its own currency. Plugging the previous assumption into 
1−ε the deﬁnition of Pi,t yields Pi,t = Ei,t P i , where P i  ≡
    1 P i (j)1−εdj
   1 
is i,t  i,t  0  i,t 
country i’s domestic price index. In turn, by substituting into the deﬁnition of PF,t 
and log-linearizing around the symmetric steady state, 
  1 
i  pF,t =  (ei,t +pi,t)di 
0 
∗  = et +pt 
i     1  i where pi,t ≡ 0  pi,t(j )dj is the (log) domestic price index for country i (expressed 
in terms of its own currency), et ≡
 
0
1 ei,t di  is the (log) effective nominal exchange 
∗  i rate, and pt  ≡
 
0
1 pi,t di  is the (log) world price index. Notice that for the world as 
a whole, there is no distinction between CPI and domestic price level, nor between 
their corresponding inﬂation rates. 
Combining the previous result with the deﬁnition of the terms of trade yields 
the expression 
st = et +pt 
∗ −pH,t  .  (16) 
Next, a relationship is derived between the terms of trade and the real exchange 
t rate. First, the bilateral real exchange rate is deﬁned with country i as Qi,t ≡
Ei,tP  i 
, Pt 
i.e.,  the ratio of the two countries’ CPIs,  both expressed in terms of domes­
tic currency. Let qt ≡
 
0
1 qi,t di be the (log) effective real exchange rate, where 
qi,t ≡ log Qi,t . It follows that 
qt = 




= et +pt 
∗ −pt 
= st +pH,t −pt 
= (1 −α) st 
where  the  last  equality  holds  only  up  to  a  ﬁrst-order  approximation  when 
η �= 1.6 
6 The  last  equality  can  be  derived  by  log-linearizing  Pt  =[ (1 −α)  +α  S 
1−η] 1−
1 
η  around  a PH,t  t 
symmetric steady state, which yields pt −pH,t = αs t. 157  7.1.  A Small Open Economy Model 
7.1.1.2  International Risk-Sharing 
Under the assumption of complete markets for securities traded internationally, a 
condition analogous to (9) must also hold for the representative household in any 
other country, say country i 
Vt,t+1  (C
i)
−σ = ξt,t+1β( C t
i 
+1)
−σ  1 
Et
iPt





where the presence of the exchange rate terms reﬂects the fact that the security pur­
chased by the country i’s household has a price Vt,t+1 and a unit payoff expressed 
in the currency of the small open economy of reference, and hence, needs to be 
converted to country i’s currency. 
The previous relation can be written in terms of our small open economy’s 
stochastic discount factor as 
Ci P i  i 
t+1  t t β 
 
Ci 
 −σ   
P i 




= Qt,t+1.  (17) 
t t+1  t+1 E
Combining (10) and (17), together with the deﬁnition for the real exchange rate 
deﬁnition gives 
1 
Ct = ϑi C
i Qi,t σ  (18) t 
for all t, and where ϑi is a constant that will generally depend on initial conditions 
regarding relative net asset positions. Henceforth, and without loss of generality, 
symmetric initial conditions are assumed (i.e., zero net foreign asset holdings and 
an ex-ante identical environment), in which case ϑi = ϑ = 1 for all i. 
Taking logs on both sides of (18) and integrating over i yields 
∗  1 




1 − α 
 






i di  is the index for world consumption (in log terms), and where 
the second equality holds only up to a ﬁrst-order approximation when η �= 1. Thus, 
the assumption of complete markets at the international level leads to a simple 
relationship linking domestic consumption with world consumption and the terms 
of trade. 
7.1.1.3  A Brief Detour: Uncovered Interest Parity and the Terms of  Trade 
Under the assumption of complete international ﬁnancial markets, the equilib­
rium price (in terms of the small open economy’s domestic currency) of a riskless 
bond denominated in country i’s currency is given by Ei,t Qi
t = Et {Qt,t+1 Ei,t+1}, 158  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
where Qi
t is the price of the bond in terms of country i’s currency. The previous 
pricing  equation  can  be  combined  with  the  domestic  bond  pricing  equation 
Qt = Et {Qt,t+1} to obtain a version of the uncovered interest-parity condition 
Et {Qt,t+1 [exp{it }−  exp{it 
∗} (Ei,t+1/Ei,t)]} = 0. 
Log-linearizing around a perfect foresight steady state, and aggregating over i, 
yields the familiar expression 
it = it 
∗ + Et {�et+1}.  (20) 
Combining  the  deﬁnition  of  the  (log)  terms  of  trade  with  (20)  yields  the 
stochastic difference equation 
st = (it 
∗ − Et {πt
∗
+1}) − (it − Et {πH,t+1}) + Et {st+1}.  (21) 
As shown in appendix 7.1, the terms of trade are pinned down uniquely in 
the perfect foresight steady state. That fact, combined with the assumption of 
stationarity in the model’s driving forces and unit relative prices in the steady 









+k+1) − (it+k − πH,t+k+1)]
  




i.e., the terms of trade are a function of current and anticipated real interest rate 
differentials. 
It must be pointed out that while equations (21) and (22) provide a conve­
nient (and intuitive) way of representing the connection between terms of trade 
and interest rate differentials, they do not constitute an additional independent 
equilibrium condition. In particular, it is easy to check that (21) can be derived 
by combining the consumption Euler equations for both the domestic and world 
economies with the risk sharing condition (19) and equation (15). 
Next, attention is turned to the supply side of the economy. 
7 The assumption regarding the steady state implies that the real interest rate differential will revert 
to a zero mean. More generally, the real interest rate differential will revert to a constant mean, as long 
as the terms of trade are stationary in ﬁrst differences. That would be the case if, say, the technology 
parameter had a unit root or a different average rate of growth relative to the rest of the world. Those 
cases would have persistent real interest rate differentials. 7.1.  A Small Open Economy Model  159 
7.1.2  Firms 
7.1.2.1  Technology 
A typical ﬁrm in the home economy produces a differentiated good with a linear 
technology represented by the production function 
Yt(j) = At Nt(j) 
where  at ≡ log At  follows  the  AR(1)  process  at = ρa  at−1 +εt,  and  where 
j ∈[ 0,1] is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc index.8 
Hence, the real marginal cost (expressed in terms of domestic prices) will be 
common across domestic ﬁrms and given by 
mct =− ν +wt −pH,t −at 
where ν ≡−log(1 −τ),  with τ  being an employment subsidy whose role is 
discussed later in more detail. 
7.1.2.2  Price Setting 
As in the basic model of chapter 3, it is assumed that ﬁrms set prices in a staggered 
fashion. In particular, a measure 1 −θ of (randomly selected) ﬁrms sets new prices 
each period, with an individual ﬁrm’s probability of reoptimizing in any given 
period being independent of the time elapsed since it last reset its price. As shown 
in chapter 3, the optimal price-setting strategy for the typical ﬁrm resetting its 
price in period t can be approximated by the (log-linear) rule 
∞ 
pH,t = µ+(1 −βθ) 
  
(βθ)
k Et{mct+k +pH,t+k}  (23) 
k=0 
where pH,t denotes the log of newly set domestic prices, and µ ≡ log ε−
ε 
1  is the 
log of the (gross) markup in the steady state (or, equivalently, the equilibrium 
markup in the ﬂexible price economy).9 
8 An extension of the analysis to the case of decreasing returns considered in chapter 3 is straight­
forward. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible the analysis here is restricted to the case of 
constant returns. 
9 pH,t is used to denote newly set prices instead of pt 
∗ (used in chapter 3), because in this chapter 
letters with an asterisk refer to world economy variables. 160  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
7.2  Equilibrium 
7.2.1  Aggregate Demand and Output Determination 
7.2.1.1  Consumption and Output in the Small Open Economy 
Goods market clearing in the home economy requires 
Yt(j) 
  1 
C




(24) = CH,t(j)+ H,t
0  PH,t 




















for all j ∈[ 0,1] and all t, where Ci  (j) denotes country i’s demand for good j H,t
produced in the home economy. Notice that the second equality has made use of (5) 
and (6) together with the assumption of symmetric preferences across countries, 
   −ε   −γ  Pi   −η which implies Ci  (j) = α
PH,t(j)  PH,t  F,t  Ci . H,t PH,t  Ei,tPi  Pt
i  t 
F,t 
Plugging  (24)  into  the  deﬁnition  of  aggregate  domestic  output 
ε−1 Yt ≡
   
0
1 Yt(j)1− 1 
ε  dj
   ε 
yields 



















 −η     1 
 
F,t 
 γ−η   
= (1 −α) Ct +α
Ei,tP i 
η  C









  1   i Si,t




(25) t  i,t Pt  0 
S Q 
where the last equality follows from (18), and where Si denotes the effective terms  t 
of trade for country i, while Si,t denotes the bilateral terms of trade between the 
home economy and country i. Notice that in the particular case of σ = η = γ = 1 
the previous condition can be written exactly as10 
Yt = Ct S 
α.  (26) t 
10 Here  one  must  use  the  fact  that  under  the  assumption  η = 1,  the  CPI  takes  the  form  Pt = 
(PH,t)1−α(PF,t)α, thus implying  Pt  =
  PF,t  α  α. PH,t  PH,t  = St 161  7.2.  Equilibrium 




i di  = 0, the following ﬁrst-order log-
linear approximation to (25) is derived around the symmetric steady state 
1 




qt  σ 
αω 
= ct +  st  (27)
σ 
where ω ≡ σγ  +(1 −α)(ση  −1). Notice that σ = η = γ = 1 implies ω = 1. 
A condition analogous to the one above will hold for all countries. Thus, for a 
generic country i it can be rewritten as yi = ci + αω si. By aggregating over all  t  t σ t 
countries, a world market clearing condition can be derived as 
  1 
yt 
∗ ≡  yt
i di 
0    1 
=  ct
i di  ≡ ct 
∗  (28) 
0 
where yt 
∗ and ct 
∗ are indexes for world output and consumption (in log terms), and 




i di  = 0. 
Combining (27) with (19) and (28) yields 
∗  1 
yt = yt  +  st  (29)
σα 
σ where σα ≡ 1+α(ω−1) > 0. 
Finally, combining (27) with Euler equation (12) gives 
1  αω 
yt = Et{yt+1}−  (it −Et{πt+1}−ρ)−  Et{�st+1}
σ σ 
1  α� 
= Et{yt+1}−  (it −Et{πH,t+1}−ρ)−  Et{�st+1}
σ σ 
1  ∗  = Et{yt+1}−  (it −Et{πH,t+1}−ρ)+α� Et{�yt+1}  (30)
σα 
where � ≡ (σγ −1)+(1 −α)(ση −1) = ω −1. Note that, in general, the degree 
of openness inﬂuences the sensitivity of output to any given change in the domes­
tic real rate it −Et{πH,t+1}, given world output. In particular, if �>  0 (i.e., for 
relatively high values of η and γ), an increase in openness raises that sensitivity 
(i.e., σα is smaller). The reason is the direct negative effect of an increase in the 
real rate on aggregate demand and output is ampliﬁed by the induced real appre­
ciation (and the consequent switch of expenditure toward foreign goods). This 
will be partly offset by any increase in CPI inﬂation relative to domestic inﬂation 
induced by the expected real depreciation, which would dampen the change in the 
consumption-based real rate it −Et{πt+1}—which is the one ultimately relevant 
for aggregate demand—relative to it −Et{πH,t+1}. 162	 7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
7.2.1.2	 The Trade Balance 
Let nxt ≡ 
   1   
Yt − 
Pt  Ct 
  
denote net exports in terms of domestic output,  Y  PH,t 
expressed  as  a  fraction  of  steady  state  output  Y.  In  the  particular  case  of 
σ = η = γ = 1, it follows from (25) that PH,t  Yt = PtCt for all t, thus implying 
a balanced trade at all times. More generally, a ﬁrst-order approximation yields 
nxt = yt − ct − αs t , which combined with (27) implies a simple relation between 








Again,  in the special case of σ = η = γ = 1,  nxt = 0 for all t,  though the 
latter property will also hold for any conﬁguration of those parameters satisfying 
σ(γ  − 1) + (1 − α)  (ση  − 1) = 0.  More generally,  the sign of the relationship 
between the terms of trade and net exports is ambiguous, depending on the relative 
size of σ, γ , and η. 
7.2.2  The Supply Side: Marginal Cost and Inﬂation Dynamics 
7.2.2.1	 Aggregate Output and Employment 
ε−1 Let Yt ≡ 
   
0
1 Yt(j )1− 1 
ε  dj
   ε 
represent an index for aggregate domestic out­
put, analogous to the one introduced for consumption. As in chapter 3, one can 
derive an approximate aggregate production function relating the previous index 
to aggregate employment. Hence, notice that 
  1    1    −ε Yt	 Pt(j) 
Nt ≡	 Nt(j) dj =  dj. 
0  At  0  Pt 
As shown in chapter 3,  however,  variations in dt ≡ 
   1  Pt(j )  −ε  dj  around 0  Pt 
the perfect foresight steady state are of second order. Thus, and up to a ﬁrst-
order approximation, the following relationship between aggregate output and 
employment holds as 
yt = at + nt.	 (32) 
7.2.2.2	 Marginal Cost and Inﬂation Dynamics in the 
Small Open Economy 
As was shown in chapter 3, the (log-linearized) optimal price-setting condition 
(23) can be combined with the (log linearized) difference equation describing the 
evolution of domestic prices (as a function of newly set prices) to yield an equation 163  7.2.  Equilibrium 
determining domestic inﬂation as a function of deviations of marginal cost from 
its steady state value 
πH,t = βE t{πH,t+1}+λ   (33) mct 
where λ ≡
(1−βθ)(1−θ)  . Thus,  relationship (33) does not depend on any of the  θ 
parameters that characterize the open economy. On the other hand, the determi­
nation of real marginal cost as a function of domestic output in the open economy 
differs somewhat from that in the closed economy,  due to the existence of a 
wedge between output and consumption, and between domestic and consumer 
prices. Thus, in the present model, 
mct =− ν +(wt −pH,t)−at 
=− ν +(wt −pt)+(pt −pH,t)−at 
=− ν +σc t +ϕn t +αs t −at 
=− ν +σy t 
∗ +ϕy t +st −(1 +ϕ) at  (34) 
where the last equality makes use of (19) and (32). Thus, it can be seen that the 
marginal cost is increasing in the terms of trade and world output. Both variables 
end up inﬂuencing the real wage through the wealth effect on labor supply resulting 
from their impact on domestic consumption. In addition, changes in the terms of 
trade have a direct effect on the product wage for any given consumption wage. 
The inﬂuence of technology (through its direct effect on labor productivity) and 
of domestic output (through its effect on employment and, hence, the real wage 
for given output) is analogous to that observed in the closed economy. 
Finally,  using (29) to substitute for st,  the previous expression for the real 
marginal cost in terms of domestic output and productivity,  as well as world 
output, can be rewritten as 
mct =− ν +(σα +ϕ) yt +(σ −σα) y  t 
∗ −(1 +ϕ) at.  (35) 
Generally, in the open economy, a change in domestic output has an effect on 
marginal cost through its impact on employment (captured by ϕ) and the terms 
of trade (captured by σα, which is a function of the degree of openness and the 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods). World output, on the other 
hand, affects marginal cost through its effect on consumption (and, hence, the 
real wage as captured by σ) and the terms of trade (captured by σα). Note that 
the sign of its impact on marginal cost is ambiguous. Under the assumption of 
�>  0 (i.e., high substitutability among goods produced in different countries), 
σ>σ α, implying that an increase in world output raises the marginal cost. This 
is so because in that case the size of the real appreciation needed to absorb the 
change in relative supplies is small with its negative effects on marginal cost 
more than offset by the positive effect from a higher real wage. Notice that in 164  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
the special cases α = 0 and/or σ = η = γ = 1, which imply σ = σα, the domestic 
real marginal cost is completely insulated from movements in foreign output. 
How does the degree of openness affect the sensitivity of marginal cost and 
inﬂation to changes in domestic and world output?  Note also that,  under the 
same assumption of high substitutability (�>  0) considered above, an increase 
in openness reduces the impact of a change in domestic output on marginal cost 
(and, hence, on inﬂation), for it lowers the size of the required adjustment in the 
terms of trade. By the same token, it raises the positive impact of a change in 
world output on marginal cost by limiting the size of the associated variation in 
the terms of trade and, hence, its countervailing effect. 
Finally, and for future reference, note that under ﬂexible prices, mct =− µ for 
all t. Thus, the natural level of output in the open economy is given by 
yt
n = �0 +�a at +�∗ yt 
∗  (36) 
where �0 ≡ 
v−µ ,� a ≡ 
1+ϕ > 0, and �∗ ≡−
α� σα . Note that the sign of the  σα+ϕ  σα+ϕ  σα+ϕ 
effect of world output on the domestic natural output is ambiguous, depending 
on the sign of the effect of the former on domestic marginal cost, which in turn 
depends on the relative importance of the terms of trade effect discussed above. 
7.2.3  Equilibrium Dynamics: A Canonical Representation 
In this section the linearized equilibrium dynamics for the small open economy 
is shown to have a representation in terms of output gap and domestic inﬂation 
analogous to its closed economy counterpart. 
Let   yt ≡ yt −yn denote the domestic output gap. Given (35) and the fact that y  ∗ 
t t 
is invariant to domestic developments, it follows that the domestic real marginal 
cost and the output gap are related according to 
  yt. mct = (σα +ϕ)  
Combining the previous expression with (33) the following version of the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve for the open economy can be derived 
πH,t = βEt{πH,t+1}+κα   yt  (37) 
where κα ≡ λ(σα +ϕ). Notice that for α = 0 (or σ = η = γ = 1) the slope coef­
ﬁcient is given by λ(σ +ϕ) as in the standard, closed economy New Keynesian 
Phillips curve. More generally, note that the form of the inﬂation equation for 
the open economy corresponds to that of the closed economy, at least as far as 
domestic inﬂation is concerned. The degree of openness α affects the dynamics 
of inﬂation only through its inﬂuence on the slope of the NKPC, i.e., the size of 
the inﬂation response to any given variation in the output gap. If �>  0 (which            
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obtains for “high” values of η and γ, i.e., under high substitutability of goods 
produced in different countries), an increase in openness lowers σα, dampening 
the real depreciation induced by an increase in domestic output and, as a result, 
the effect of the latter on marginal cost and inﬂation. 
Using (30) it is straightforward to derive a version of the so-called dynamic IS 
equation for the open economy in terms of the output gap 
1 










+1}  (39) t  σα +ϕ 
is the small open economy’s natural rate of interest. 
Thus, it is seen that the small open economy’s equilibrium is characterized by 
a forward looking IS-type equation similar to that found in the closed economy. 
Two differences can be pointed out, however. First, as discussed above, the degree 
of openness inﬂuences the sensitivity of the output gap to interest rate changes. 
Second, openness generally makes the natural interest rate depend on expected 
world output growth, in addition to domestic productivity. 
7.3  Equilibrium Dynamics under an Interest Rate Rule 
Next, the equilibrium response of our small open economy to a variety of shocks 
is analyzed. In so doing, it is assumed that the monetary authority follows an 
interest rate rule of the form already assumed in chapter 3, namely 
it = ρ +φπ πH,t +φy   yt +vt  (40) 
where vt  is an exogenous component, and where φπ  and φy  are non-negative 
coefﬁcients chosen by the monetary authority. 
Combining (37), (38), and (40), the equilibrium dynamics for the output gap 





















+Bα (  rt  −vt)  (41) 
n where   r  ≡ rn −ρ, and  t t 
σα  1 −βφπ  1
Aα ≡ �α 
  
σακα  κα +β(σα +φy) 
  




with �α ≡ σα+φy
1 
+καφπ . Note that the previous system takes the same form as the 
one analyzed in chapter 3 for the closed economy, with the only difference lying 166  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
in the fact that some of the coefﬁcients are a function of the “open economy 
n parameters” α, η, and γ, and that   r  is now given by (39). In particular, the con- t 
dition for a locally unique stationary equilibrium under rule (40) takes the same 
form as shown in chapter 3, namely 
κα (φπ −1)+(1 −β)  φy > 0,  (42) 
which is assumed to hold for the remainder of this section. 
Section 7.3.1 uses the previous framework to examine the economy’s response 
to an exogenous monetary policy shock, i.e., an exogenous change in vt.G i v e n 
the isomorphism with the closed economy model of chapter 4, many of the results 
derived there can be exploited. 
The analysis of the effects of a technology shock (or a change in world output), 
which is not pursued below, goes along the same lines as in chapter 3. First, one 
should determine the implications of the shock considered for the natural interest 
n rate  r  and then proceed to solve for the equilibrium response of the output gap and  t 
domestic inﬂation exactly as done below for the case of a monetary policy shock, 
n given the symmetry with which vt and   r  enter the equilibrium conditions.11 
t 
7.3.1  The Effects of a Monetary Policy Shock 
Assume that the exogenous component of the interest rate vt  follows an AR(1) 
process 
vt = ρv vt−1 +εt
v 
where ρv ∈[ 0,1). 
n The natural rate of interest is not affected by a monetary policy shock so  r  = 0 t 
for all t for the purposes of this exercise. As in chapter 3, let us guess that the 
solution takes the form   yt = ψyv vt  and πt = ψπv vt,  where ψyv and ψπv are 
coefﬁcients to be determined. Imposing the guessed solution on (37) and (38) and 
using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients, 
yt =  yt 
=− (1 −βρv)�v vt 
and 
πH,t =− κα�v vt 
where �v ≡ (1−βρv)[σα(1−ρv
1 
)+φy]+κα(φπ−ρv). It can be easily shown that as long as 
(42) is satisﬁed, �v > 0. Hence, as in the closed economy, an exogenous increase 
in the interest rate leads to a persistent decline in output and inﬂation. The size 
11 Of course, as in chapter 3, it must be taken into account that a technology shock or a shock to world 
output also leads to a variation in the natural output level, thus breaking the identity between output and 
the output gap. 167  7.3.  Equilibrium Dynamics under an Interest Rate Rule 
of the effect of the shock relative to the closed economy benchmark depends 
on the values taken by a number of parameters. More speciﬁcally, if the degree of 
substitutability among goods produced in different countries is high (i.e., if η and 
γ are high, then ω>  1) then �v can be shown to be increasing in the degree of 
openness, thus implying that a given monetary policy shock will have a larger 
impact in the small open economy than in its closed economy counterpart. 
Using interest rate rule (40) can determine the response of the nominal rate, 
taking into account the central bank’s endogenous reaction to changes in inﬂation 
and the output gap 
it =
 
1 −�v(φπκα +φy(1 −βρv))
  
vt. 
Note that as in the closed economy model, the full response of the nominal rate 
may be positive or negative, depending on parameter values. The response of the 
real interest rate (expressed in terms of domestic goods) is given by 
rt = it −Et {πH,t+1} 
=
 
1 −�v((φπ −ρv)κα +φy(1 −βρv))
  
vt 
which can be shown to increase when vt rises (because the term in square brackets 
is unambiguously positive). 
Using (29) can uncover the response of the terms of trade to the monetary policy 
shock 
st = σαyt 
=− σα(1 −βρv)�v vt. 
The change in the nominal exchange rate is given in turn by 
�et = �st +πH,t 
=− σα(1 −βρv)�v �vt −κα�v vt. 
Thus, a monetary policy contraction leads to an improvement in the terms of 
trade (i.e., a decrease in the relative price of foreign goods) and a nominal exchange 
rate appreciation. 
Note that, in the long run, the terms of trade revert back to their original level 
in response to the monetary policy shock, while the (log) levels of both domestic 
prices and the nominal exchange rate experience a permanent change of size 
−
κα�v  (given an initial shock of size normalized to unity).  1−ρv 
Hence, the exchange rate will overshoot its long-run level in response to the 
monetary policy shock, if and only if, 
σα(1 −βρv)(1 −ρv)>κ αρv 
which requires that the shock is not too persistent. It can be easily shown that the 
previous condition corresponds to that for an increase in the nominal interest rate 168  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
in response to a positive vt shock. Note that, in that case, the subsequent exchange 
rate depreciation required by the interest parity condition (20) leads to an initial 
overshooting. 
7.4  Optimal Monetary Policy: A Special Case 
This section derives and characterizes the optimal monetary policy for the small 
open economy described above, as well as the implications of that policy for a 
number of macroeconomic variables. The analysis, which follows closely that of 
Galí and Monacelli (2005), is restricted to a special case for which a second-order 
approximation to the welfare of the representative consumer can be easily derived 
analytically. Its conclusions should thus not be taken as applying to a more general 
environment. Instead, this exercise is presented as an illustration of the approach 
to optimal monetary design to an open economy. 
Let us take as a benchmark the basic New Keynesian model developed in chap­
ter 3. As discussed in that chapter, under the assumption of a constant employment 
subsidy τ that neutralizes the distortion associated with ﬁrms’ market power, the 
optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates the ﬂexible price equilibrium 
allocation. The intuition for that result is straightforward: With the subsidy in 
place, there is only one effective distortion left in the economy, namely, sticky 
prices. By stabilizing markups at their “frictionless” level, nominal rigidities cease 
to be binding, since ﬁrms do not feel any desire to adjust prices. By construc­
tion, the resulting equilibrium allocation is efﬁcient, and the price level remains 
constant. 
In an open economy—and as noted, among others, by Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2001)—there is an additional factor that distorts the incentives of the monetary 
authority beyond the presence of market power: the possibility of inﬂuencing 
the terms of trade in a way beneﬁcial to domestic consumers. This possibility 
is a consequence of the imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign 
goods, combined with sticky prices (that render monetary policy non-neutral). As 
shown below, and as discussed by Benigno and Benigno (2003) in the context 
of a two-country model, the introduction of an employment subsidy that exactly 
offsets the market power distortion is not sufﬁcient to render the ﬂexible price 
equilibrium allocation optimal, for, at the margin, the monetary authority would 
have an incentive to deviate from it to improve the terms of trade. 
For the special parameter conﬁguration σ = η = γ = 1 the employment subsidy 
that exactly offsets the combined effects of market power and the terms of trade 
distortions can be derived analytically, thus rendering the ﬂexible price equilib­
rium allocation optimal. That result, in turn, rules out the existence of an average 
inﬂation (or deﬂation) bias and allows the focus on policies consistent with zero 
average inﬂation in a way analogous to the analysis for the closed economy found 7.4.  Optimal Monetary Policy: A Special Case  169 
in chapter 4. Perhaps not surprisingly, and as shown below, the policy that max­
imizes welfare in that case requires that domestic inﬂation be fully stabilized, 
while allowing the nominal exchange rate (and, as a result, CPI inﬂation) to adjust 
as needed in order to replicate the response of the terms of trade that would be 
obtained under ﬂexible prices. 
One may wonder to what extent the optimality of strict domestic inﬂation tar­
geting is speciﬁc to the special case considered here or whether it carries over to a 
more general case. The optimal policy analysis undertaken in Faia and Monacelli 
(2007), using a model nearly identical to the one considered here, suggests that 
while the optimal policy involves some variation in the domestic price level, the 
latter is almost negligible from a quantitative point of view, thus making strict 
domestic inﬂation targeting a good approximation to the optimal policy (or at 
least conditional on the productivity shocks considered here). Using a different 
approach, de Paoli (2006) reaches a similar conclusion, except when an (implau­
sibly) high elasticity of substitution is assumed.12 But even in the latter case, the 
losses that arise from following a domestic inﬂation targeting policy are negligi­
ble.13 More generally, it is clear that there are several channels in the open economy 
that may potentially render a strict domestic inﬂation policy suboptimal, including 
a nonunitary elasticity of substitution, local currency pricing, incomplete ﬁnancial 
markets, and so on, all of which are unrelated to the sources of policy tradeoffs 
that may potentially arise in the closed economy. The quantitative signiﬁcance of 
the effects of those channels (individually or jointly) still needs to be explored in 
the literature, and its analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. 
With that consideration in mind, let us next turn to the analysis of the optimal 
policy in the special case mentioned above. 
7.4.1  The Efﬁcient Allocation and Its Decentralization 
Let us ﬁrst characterize the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of a social 
planner facing the same resource constraints to which the small open economy is 
subject in equilibrium (in relation to the rest of the world), given the assumption of 
complete markets. In that case, the optimal allocation must maximize U(Ct,N t) 
subject to (i) the technological constraint Yt = AtNt, (ii) a consumption/output 
possibilities set implicit in the international risk-sharing conditions (18), and (iii) 
the market clearing condition (25). 
12 Those results are conditional on productivity shocks being the driving force. Not surprisingly, in 
the presence of cost-push shocks of the kind considered in chapter 5, stabilizing domestic inﬂation is not 
optimal (as in the closed economy). 
13 In solving the optimal policy problem for the general case, de Paoli (2006) adopts the linear– 
quadratic approach originally developed in Benigno and Woodford (2005), which replaces the linear 
terms in the approximation to the households’ welfare losses using a second-order approximation to 
the equilibrium conditions. Faia and Monacelli (2007) solve for the Ramsey policy using the original 
nonlinear equilibrium conditions as constraints of the policy problem. 170  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
Consider the special case of σ = η = γ = 1. In that case, (19) and (26) imply 
the exact expression Ct = Yt 
1−α (Yt 
∗ )α. The optimal allocation (from the viewpoint 
of the small open economy, which takes world output as given) must satisfy 
Un(Ct,N t)  Ct − = (1 −α)
Uc(Ct,N t)  Nt 
which, under the assumed preferences and given σ = 1, can be written as 
Ct Nt




thus implying a constant employment N = (1 −α)1+ϕ . 
Notice, on the other hand, that the ﬂexible price equilibrium in the small open 
economy (with corresponding variables denoted with an n superscript) satisﬁes 
1 




(1 −τ)  Un 
=− (S
n)
α  n,t 










= (1 −τ)  (Nt
n)
1+ϕ 
where the term on the right side of the second equality corresponds to the real 
wage (net of the subsidy) normalized by productivity, and where the third equality 
follows from (26). 
Hence, by setting τ such that (1 −τ)(1 −α) = 1 − ε 
1 is satisﬁed or, equivalently, 
ν = µ+log(1 −α), the optimality of the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation is 
guaranteed. As in the closed economy case, the optimal monetary policy requires 
stabilizing the output gap (i.e.,   yt = 0 for all t). Equation (37) then implies that 
domestic prices are also stabilized under that optimal policy (i.e., πH,t = 0 for 
all t). Thus, in the special case under consideration, (strict) domestic inﬂation 
targeting (DIT) is indeed the optimal policy. 
7.4.2  Implementation and Macroeconomic Implications 
This section discusses the implementation of a domestic inﬂation targeting policy 
and characterizes some of its equilibrium implications. While that policy has been 
shown to be optimal only for the special case considered above, the implications 
of that policy for the general case will also be considered. 171  7.4.  Optimal Monetary Policy: A Special Case 
7.4.2.1  Implementation 
As discussed above, full stabilization of domestic prices implies 
  yt = πH,t = 0 
n for all t. This in turn implies that yt = yt
n and it = rt  will hold in equilibrium for 
all t, with all the remaining variables matching their natural levels at all times. 
n For the reasons discussed in chapter 4, an interest rate rule of the form it = rt 
is associated with an indeterminate equilibrium, and hence, does not guarantee 
that the outcome of full price stability be attained. That result follows from the 
equivalence between the dynamical system describing the equilibrium of the small 
open economy and that of the closed economy of chapter 4. As shown there, the 
indeterminacy problem can be avoided, and the uniqueness of the price stability 
outcome restored by having the central bank follow a rule that makes the interest 
rate respond with sufﬁcient strength to deviations of domestic inﬂation and/or the 
output gap from target. More precisely, the central bank can guarantee that the 
desired outcome is attained if it commits to a rule of the form 
it = r
n + φπ πH,t + φy   yt  (43) t 
where κα (φπ − 1)+ (1 − β)φy > 0. Note that, in equilibrium, the term φπ πH,t + 
n φy   yt will vanish (because   yt = πH,t = 0), implying that it = rt  for all t. 
7.4.2.2  Macroeconomic Implications 
Under strict domestic inﬂation targeting, the behavior of real variables in the small 
open economy corresponds to the one that would be observed in the absence of 
nominal rigidities. Hence, it is seen from the inspection of equation (36) that 
domestic output always increases in response to a positive technology shock at 
home. As discussed earlier, the sign of the response to a rise in world output is 
ambiguous, however, and it depends on the sign of �, which in turn depends on the 
size of the substitutability parameters γ and η and the risk aversion parameter σ. 
The natural level of the terms of trade is given by 
st
n = σα (yt
n − yt 
∗ ) 
= σα (�0 + �a at − �y t 
∗ ) 






ϕ > 0. Thus, given world output, an improvement in domestic 
technology always leads to a real depreciation through its expansionary effect on 
domestic output. On the other hand, an increase in world output always generates 
an improvement in the domestic terms of trade (i.e., a real appreciation), given 
domestic technology. 
Given  that  domestic  prices  are  fully  stabilized  under  DIT,  it  follows  that 
et
DIT = st
n − pt 
∗ ,  i.e.,  the nominal exchange rate moves one for one with the 172  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
(natural) terms of trade and (inversely) with the world price level. Assuming 
constant world prices, the nominal exchange rate will inherit all the statistical 
properties of the natural terms of trade. Accordingly, the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate under DIT will be proportional to the volatility of the gap between 
the natural level of domestic output (in turn related to productivity) and world out­
put. In particular, that volatility will tend to be low when domestic natural output 
displays a strong positive comovement with world output. When that comove­
ment is low (or negative), possibly because of a large idiosyncratic component in 
domestic productivity, the volatility of the terms of trade and the nominal exchange 
rate under DIT will be enhanced. 
The implied equilibrium process for the CPI can also be derived. Given the 
constancy of domestic prices it is given by 
pt





Thus, it is seen that under the DIT regime, the CPI level will also vary with the 
(natural) terms of trade and will inherit its statistical properties. If the economy is 
very open, and if domestic productivity (and hence, the natural level of domestic 
output) is not much synchronized with world output, CPI prices could potentially 
be highly volatile, even if the domestic price level is constant. 
An important lesson emerges from the previous analysis: Potentially large and 
persistent ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate, as well as in some inﬂation 
measures (like the CPI), are not necessarily undesirable, nor do they require a 
policy response aimed at dampening such ﬂuctuations. Instead, and especially 
for an economy that is very open and subject to large idiosyncratic shocks, those 
ﬂuctuations may be an equilibrium consequence of the adoption of an optimal 
policy, as illustrated by the model above. 
7.4.3  The Welfare Costs of Deviations from the Optimal Policy 
Under the particular assumptions for which strict domestic inﬂation targeting 
has been shown to be optimal (i.e., log utility and unit elasticity of substitution 
between goods of different origin),  it is relatively straightforward to derive a 
second-order approximation to the utility losses of the domestic representative 
consumer resulting from the optimal policy deviations. Those losses, expressed 
as a fraction of steady state consumption, can be written as 
∞     
W =−




2  +(1 +ϕ)    y 
2  .  (44)
2  λ 
H,t  t 
t=0 7.5.  Simple Monetary Policy Rules for the Small Open Economy  173 
The derivation of (44) goes along the lines of that for the closed economy shown 
in appendix 4.1 of chapter 4. The reader is referred to Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
for the details speciﬁc to (44). 
The expected period welfare losses of any policy that deviates from strict 






var(πH,t)+(1 +ϕ) var(  yt)
 
.  (45)
2  λ 
Note that the previous expressions for the welfare losses are, up to the propor­
tionality constant (1 −α), identical to the ones derived for the closed economy in 
chapter 4, with domestic inﬂation (and not CPI inﬂation) being the relevant inﬂa­
tion variable. Below, (45) is used to assess the welfare implications of alternative 
monetary policy rules and to rank those rules on welfare grounds. 
7.5  Simple Monetary Policy Rules for the Small Open Economy 
This section analyzes the macroeconomic implications of three alternative mone­
tary policy regimes for the small open economy. Two of the simple rules considered 
are stylized Taylor-type rules. The ﬁrst has the domestic interest rate respond sys­
tematically to domestic inﬂation, whereas the second assumes that CPI inﬂation 
is the variable the domestic central bank reacts to.  The third rule considered 
is one that pegs the effective nominal exchange rate.  Formally,  the domestic 
inﬂation-based Taylor rule (DITR, for short) is speciﬁed as 
it = ρ +φπ πH,t. 
The CPI inﬂation-based Taylor rule (CITR, for short) is assumed to take the 
form 
it = ρ +φπ πt. 
Finally, the exchange rate peg (PEG, for short) implies 
et = 0 
for all t. 
Below,  a  comparison  is  provided  of  the  equilibrium  properties  of  several 
macroeconomic variables under the above simple rules for a calibrated version 
of the model economy. Such properties are compared to those associated with a 
strict DIT, the policy that is optimal under the conditions discussed above, and 
which is assumed to be satisﬁed in the baseline calibration. Much of this chapter’s 
analysis draws directly from Galí and Monacelli (2005). 174  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
7.5.1  A Numerical Analysis of Alternative Rules 
7.5.1.1  Calibration 
This section presents some quantitative results based on a calibrated version of 
the small open economy. The baseline calibration set σ = η = γ = 1i naw a y 
consistent with the special case considered above. It is assumed that ϕ = 3, which 
implies a labor supply elasticity of  1
3. ε, the elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated goods (of the same origin) is set equal to 6, thus implying a steady 
state markup of 20 percent. Parameter θ is set equal to 0.75, a value consistent 
with an average period of one year between price adjustments.  It is assumed 
that β = 0.99, which implies a riskless annual return of about 4 percent in the 
steady state. A baseline value for α (the degree of openness) is set at 0.4. The 
latter corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio in Canada, which is taken as 
a prototype small open economy. The calibration of the interest rate rules follows 
the original Taylor calibration and sets φπ equal to 1.5. 
In order to calibrate the stochastic properties of the exogenous driving forces, 
let us ﬁt AR(1) processes to (log) labor productivity in Canada (the proxy for 
domestic productivity), and (log) U.S. GDP (taken as a proxy for world output), 
using quarterly, Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁltered data over the sample period 1963: 
1–2002:4. The following estimates are obtained (with standard errors shown in 
parentheses) 
at = 0.66 at−1 + εt
a , σa = 0.0071 
(0.06) 
yt 
∗ = 0.86 yt
∗
−1 + εt 




∗ ) = 0.3. 
7.5.1.2  Impulse Responses 
First described are the dynamic effects of a domestic productivity shock on a num­
ber of macroeconomic variables. Figure 7.1 displays the impulse responses to a 
unit innovation in at under the four regimes considered. By construction, domestic 
inﬂation and the output gap remain unchanged under the optimal policy (DIT). It 
is also seen that the shock leads to a persistent reduction in the domestic interest 
rate, as it is needed in order to support the transitory expansion in consumption 
and output consistent with the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation. Given the 
constancy of the world nominal interest rate, uncovered interest parity implies 
an initial nominal depreciation followed by expectations of a future appreciation, 
as reﬂected in the response of the nominal exchange rate. Given constant world 
prices and the stationarity of the terms of trade, the constancy of domestic prices 
implies a mean-reverting response of the nominal exchange rate. 
It is interesting to contrast the implied dynamic behavior of the same variables 
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Figure 7.1  Impulse Responses to a Domestic Productivity Shock 
under Alternative Policy Rules 
and CITR). Notice, at ﬁrst, that both rules generate, unlike the optimal policy, a 
permanent fall in both domestic and CPI prices. The unit root in domestic prices 
is then mirrored, under both rules, by the unit root in the nominal exchange rate. 
A key difference between the two Taylor rules concerns the behavior of the 
terms of trade. Thus, under DITR there is a real depreciation on impact with the 
terms of trade reverting gradually to the steady state afterwards (mirroring closely 
the response under the optimal policy), while under CITR the initial response of 
the terms of trade is more muted and is followed by a hump-shaped pattern. The 
intuition is simple. Under both rules, the rise in domestic productivity and the 
required real depreciation lead, for given domestic prices, to an increase in CPI 
inﬂation. However, under CITR the desired stabilization of CPI inﬂation is partly 176  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
achieved relative to DITR, by means of a more muted response of the terms of trade 
(since the latter affect the CPI), and a fall in domestic prices. The latter, in turn, 
requires a negative output gap and hence, a more contractionary monetary policy 
(i.e., a higher interest rate). Under the present calibration, that policy response 
takes the form of an initial rise in both the nominal and real interest rates, with 
the subsequent path of the real rate remaining systematically above that implied 
by the optimal policy or a DITR policy. 
Finally, the same ﬁgure displays the corresponding impulse responses under the 
PEG policy. Notice that the responses of output gap and inﬂation are qualitatively 
similar to the CITR case. However, the impossibility of lowering the nominal 
rate and letting the currency depreciate, as would be needed in order to support 
the expansion in consumption and output required to replicate the ﬂexible price 
allocation, leads to a very limited response in the terms of trade, and as a result, 
an ampliﬁcation of the negative response of domestic inﬂation and the output gap. 
Interestingly, under a PEG, the complete stabilization of the nominal exchange 
rate generates stationarity of the domestic price level and, in turn, also of the CPI 
level (given the stationarity in the terms of trade). This is a property that the PEG 
regime shares with the optimal policy as speciﬁed above. The stationarity in the 
price level also explains why, in response to the shock, domestic inﬂation initially 
falls and then rises persistently above the steady state. 
As discussed below, the different dynamics of the terms of trade are unambigu­
ously associated with a welfare loss, relative to the optimal policy. 
7.5.1.3  Second Moments and Welfare Losses 
In order to complement the quantitative analysis, table 7.1 reports the standard 
deviations of several key variables under alternative monetary policy regimes. 
The numbers conﬁrm some of the ﬁndings that were already evident from visual 
inspection of the impulse responses. Thus,  it is seen that the critical element 
that distinguishes each simple rule relative to the optimal policy is the excess 
smoothness of both the terms of trade and the (ﬁrst-differenced) nominal exchange 
Table 7.1  Cyclical Properties of Alternative Policy Regimes 
Optimal  DI Taylor  CPI Taylor  PEG 
Output  0.95  0.68  0.72  0.86 
Domestic inﬂation  0.00  0.27  0.27  0.36 
CPI inﬂation  0.38  0.41  0.27  0.21 
Nominal interest rate  0.32  0.41  0.41  0.21 
Terms of trade  1.60  1.53  1.43  1.17 
Nominal depreciation rate  0.95  0.86  0.53  0.00 
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Table 7.2  Contribution to Welfare Losses 
DI Taylor  CPI Taylor  PEG 
Benchmark µ = 1.2,ϕ= 3 
Var(Domestic inﬂation)  0.0157  0.0151  0.0268 
Var(Output gap)  0.0009  0.0019  0.0053 
Total  0.0166  0.0170  0.0321 
Low steady state markup µ = 1.1,ϕ= 3 
Var(Domestic inﬂation)  0.0287  0.0277  0.0491 
Var(Output gap)  0.0009  0.0019  0.0053 
Total  0.0297  0.0296  0.0544 
Low elasticity of labor supply µ = 1.2,ϕ= 10 
Var(Domestic inﬂation)  0.0235  0.0240  0.0565 
Var(Output gap)  0.0005  0.0020  0.0064 
Total  0.0240  0.0261  0.0630 
Low markup and elasticity of labor supply µ = 1.1,ϕ= 10 
Var(Domestic inﬂation)  0.0431  0.0441  0.1036 
Var(Output gap)  0.0005  0.0020  0.0064 
Total  0.0436  0.0461  0.1101 
Note: Entries are percentage units of steady state consumption. 
rate.14  This in turn is reﬂected in too high a volatility of the output gap and 
domestic inﬂation under the simple rules. In particular, the PEG regime is the one 
that ampliﬁes both output gap and inﬂation volatility to the largest extent, with 
the CITR regime lying somewhere in between. Furthermore, notice that the terms 
of trade are more stable under an exchange rate peg than under any other policy 
regime. That ﬁnding, which is consistent with the evidence of Mussa (1986), 
points to the existence of “excess smoothness” in real exchange rates under ﬁxed 
exchange rates. That feature is a consequence of the inability of prices (which are 
sticky) to compensate for the constancy of the nominal exchange rate.15 
Table 7.2 reports the welfare losses associated with the three simple rules ana­
lyzed in the previous section: DITR, CITR, and PEG. There are four panels in this 
table. The top panel reports welfare losses in the case of the benchmark parameter­
ization, while the remaining three panels display the effects of lowering the steady 
state markup (as implied by an increase in ε), the elasticity of labor supply, and 
both of the aforementioned effects. All entries are to be read as percentage units 
of steady state consumption and in deviation from the ﬁrst-best represented by 
DIT. Under the baseline calibration all rules are suboptimal because they involve 
14 Statistics are reported for the nominal depreciation rate, as opposed to the level, given that both 
DITR and CITR imply a unit root in the nominal exchange rate. 
15 See Monacelli (2004) for a detailed analysis of the implications of ﬁxed exchange rates. 178  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
nontrivial deviations from full domestic price stability. Also, one result stands 
out clearly: Under all the calibrations considered, an exchange rate peg implies 
a substantially larger deviation from the ﬁrst-best than DITR and CITR, as one 
may have anticipated from the quantitative evaluation of the second moments 
conducted above. However, and as is usually the case in welfare exercises of this 
sort found in the literature, the implied welfare losses are quantitatively small for 
all policy regimes. 
Consider next the effect of lowering, respectively, the steady state markup to 
1.1, by setting ε = 11 (which implies a larger penalization of inﬂation variability in 
the loss function), and the elasticity of labor supply to 0.1 (which implies a larger 
penalization of output gap variability). This has a general effect of generating 
a substantial magniﬁcation of the welfare losses relative to the benchmark case, 
especially in the third exercise where both parameters are lowered simultaneously. 
In the case of low markup and low elasticity of labor supply, the PEG regime leads 
to nontrivial welfare losses relative to the optimum. Notice also that under all 
scenarios considered here the two stylized Taylor rules, DITR and CITR, imply 
very similar welfare losses. While this points to a substantial irrelevance in the 
speciﬁcation of the inﬂation index in the monetary authority’s interest rate rule, the 
same result may once again be sensitive to the assumption of complete exchange 
rate pass-through speciﬁed. 
7.6  Notes on the Literature 
Earlier work on optimizing open economy models with nominal rigidities focused 
on the transmission of monetary policy shocks,  typically represented as dis­
turbances to an exogenous stochastic process for the money supply.16  Ak e y 
contribution in that area is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who develop a two-country 
model where monopolistically competitive ﬁrms set prices before the realization 
of the shocks (i.e., one period in advance). The framework is used to analyze the 
dynamics of the exchange rate and other variables in response to a change in the 
money supply (and government spending) and the welfare effects resulting from 
that intervention. An earlier paper, by Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989), con­
tains a related analysis under the assumption of full risk-sharing among consumers 
from different countries. 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) develop a version of the Obstfeld–Rogoff model that 
allows for home-bias in preferences, leading to terms of trade effects in response 
to shocks that are argued to have potentially important welfare effects. Betts and 
Devereux (2000) revisit the analysis in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) while departing 
from the assumption of the law of one price found in the latter paper. In particular, 
they allow ﬁrms to price discriminate across markets assuming they set prices (in 
advance) in terms of the currency of the importing country (“pricing to market”). 
16 See Lane (1999) for an excellent survey of the early steps in that literature. Appendix  179 
The effects of money supply shocks on the persistence and volatility of nom­
inal and real exchange rates are analyzed under the assumption of staggered 
price setting in Kollmann (2001) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).17 
The assumption of staggered price setting (and staggered wage setting in Koll­
mann’s case) induces much richer and more realistic dynamics than that of price 
setting one period in advance. 
A more recent strand of the literature has attempted to go beyond the analysis of 
the transmission of exogenous monetary policy shocks, and has focused instead 
on the implications of sticky price open economy models for the design of optimal 
monetary policy, using a welfare theoretic approach.18 Early examples of papers 
analyzing the properties of alternative monetary policy arrangements in a two-
country setting assumed that prices are set one period in advance. They include the 
work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003), both using 
the assumption of producer currency pricing. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), 
Sutherland (2003), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) 
use the same assumption in the context of economies with local currency pricing. 
More recent frameworks have instead adopted the staggered price-setting struc­
ture à la Calvo. Galí and Monacelli (2005), on which the analysis of this chapter 
is based, is an illustration of work along those lines for a small open economy. 
An extension of that framework, incorporating cost-push shocks, can be found 
in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2001). Kollmann (2002) considers a more general 
model of a small open economy with several sources of shocks, and carries out a 
numerical analysis of the welfare implications of alternative rules. Using a sim­
ilar framework as a starting point, Monacelli (2005) shows that the introduction 
of imperfect pass-through generates a tradeoff between stabilization of domestic 
inﬂation and the output gap, leading to gains from commitment similar to those 
analyzed in chapter 5 for the closed economy. 
Finally, the papers by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), Pappa (2004), and 
Benigno and Benigno (2006) depart from the assumption of a small open economy 
and analyze the consequences of alternative monetary policy arrangement in a 
two-country framework with staggered price setting à la Calvo, and with a special 
focus on the gains from cooperation. 
Appendix 
7.1  The Perfect Foresight Steady State 
In order to show how the home economy’s terms of trade are uniquely pinned down 
in the perfect foresight steady state, symmetry is invoked among all countries 
17 Kollmann (2001) assumes prices and wages are set à la Calvo—as in the model of this chapter— 
whereas Chari et al. (2002) assume price-setting à la Taylor, i.e. with deterministic price durations. 
18 Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000) carry out an analysis similar in spirit,  but in the context of 
nonoptimizing models. 180  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
(other than the home country), and then the terms of trade and output in the home 
economy are determined. Without loss of generality,  a unit value is assumed 
for productivity in all foreign countries with a productivity level A in the home 
economy. It is shown that in the symmetric case (when A = 1) the terms of trade 
for the home economy must necessarily be equal to unity in the steady state, 
whereas output in the home economy coincides with that in the rest of the world. 
First, notice that the goods market clearing condition, when evaluated at the 
steady state, implies 
   −η    1    −γ    −η  PH  PH  PF
i 
Y = (1 − α) C + α  C
i di 
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(1 − α)+ α S
γ−η q(S)
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where equation (18), as well as the relationship 
    1     1 
P  1−η 
=  (1 − α)+ α (Si)
1−η di
PH  0 
1−η 1−η = 
 
(1 − α)+ α (S)
   1 
≡ h(S) 
and where Q = h(
S
S) ≡ q(S). Notice that q(S) is strictly increasing in S. 
Under the assumptions above, the international risk sharing condition implies 
that the relationship 
∗  1 
C = C σ Q
∗  1 
= C  q(S) σ 
must also hold in the steady state. 
Hence,  combining the two relations above and imposing the world market 
clearing condition C  ∗ = Y  ∗ yields 
Y = 
 
(1 − α) h(S)









1  ∗  = 
 
(1 − α) h(S)






∗  (46) 
where v(S)>  0, v  �(S)>  0, and v(1) = 1. References  181 
Furthermore, the clearing of the labor market in steady state implies 
   ϕ Y W 
C
σ  = 
A P 
1 − 1  PH  = A
ε 
(1 − τ) P 
1 − 1 1 
= A
ε 
(1 − τ) h(S) 
which, when combined with the sharing condition above, yields 
   1 
ϕ 
1+ϕ  1 − 1 
ϕ Y = A 
ε .  (47)
(1 − τ)(Y∗)σ S 
Notice that, conditional on A and Y  ∗, (46) and (47) constitute a system of two 
equations in Y and S with a unique solution given by 
     1 
1+ϕ  1 − 1  σ+ϕ 
Y = Y 
∗ = A σ+ϕ ε 
1 − τ 
and 
S = 1 
which in turn must imply Si = 1 for all i. 
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Exercises 
7.1  A Small Open Economy Model 
Consider a small open economy where no international trade in assets is allowed 
(implying that trade is always balanced). Hence, 
pt + ct = pH,t + yt 
where ct denotes consumption, yt is output, pH,t is the domestic price level, and 
pt is the CPI (all in logs). Assuming a constant price level in the rest of the world 
(pt 
∗ = 0), 
pt = (1 − α) pH,t + αe t 
where et is the nominal exchange rate. 
Let st ≡ et − pH,t denote the terms of trade. Under the assumption of a unit 
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, 
st = yt − yt 
∗ 
where yt 
∗ is (log) output in the rest of the world (assumed to evolve exogenously). 
The domestic aggregate technology can be written as 
yt = at + nt 
where at is an exogenous technology process. Assume perfect competition in both 
goods and labor markets with ﬂexible prices and wages. The labor supply takes 
the form 
wt − pt = σc t + ϕn t. 
Finally, assume a money demand function mt − pt = ct. 
a) Determine the equilibrium processes for output, consumption, the terms of 
trade, and the nominal exchange rate in the small open economy as a function of 
productivity at, foreign output yt 
∗, and the money supply under the assumption 
that the latter evolves exogenously. Discuss the implications of assuming σ = 1. 
b) How would your answer have to be modiﬁed if a ﬁxed, nominal exchange 
rate regime were in place? 
c) Discuss, in words, how some of the results in (a) and (b) would change 
qualitatively in the presence of imperfect competition and sticky prices. 184  7.  Monetary Policy and the Open Economy 
7.2  The Effects of Technology Shocks in the Open Economy 
Consider the small open economy model described in this chapter. The equilibrium 
dynamics for domestic inﬂation πH,t and the output gap   yt are described by the 
equations 
πH,t = βEt{πH,t+1}+κα   yt 
1 




n and where rt  is given by 
rt
n = ρ −ba t. 
Natural output is in turn given by 
yt
n = da t. 
The technology parameter follows a stationary AR(1) process 
at = ρa at−1 +εt
a 
where ρa ∈[ 0,1). 
Assume that the monetary authority follows the simple interest rate rule 
it = ρ +φπ πH,t 
where φπ > 1. 
a) Determine the response of output, domestic inﬂation, the terms of trade, and 
the nominal exchange rate to a positive domestic technology shock (Note: for the 
purposes of this exercise assume yt 
∗ = pt 
∗ = 0 for all t). 
b) Suppose that the central bank pegs the nominal exchange rate so that et = 0 
for all t. Characterize the economy’s response to a technology shock in that case. 